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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Henry Wenke appeals from the judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief. On appeal he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for
appointment of counsel.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Wenke filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, with a persistent violator enhancement.
(R., pp. 4-12.) He alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for “refus[ing] to read
police reports,” “refus[ing] to prepare for trial” prior to the district court’s ruling on a Rule
29 motion to dismiss, and that his “legal counsel” was “incompetent.” (R., p. 5.) The
alleged factual basis for these claims was that counsel, when Wenke asked him about
“conflicting statements in police reports” stated he “had not had time to read them”; that
counsel “refused to inform the court that one of the listed felony [sic] in my persistent
violator was not a felony”; trial counsel “refused to object to the fact that my family did
not have a weed farm”; and counsel “refused to address any issue in the case.” (R., p. 6
(capitalization altered).) His certified affidavit stated that trial counsel took advantage of
Wenke’s learning disabilities “to not have to properly represent [him].” (R., p. 10.) Wenke
also moved for appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp. 13-16.)
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp. 44-55.) As part of
that notice, it took judicial notice of portions of the record and of the entire trial transcript
from the underlying criminal case. (R., p. 45.)
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The facts supporting Wenke’s conviction, taken from the trial transcript, 1 are as
follows: On October 15, 2017, Wenke left his brother’s marijuana farm in Oregon with
Jennifer Hickman, his girlfriend, and Colbie Witte, Hickman’s roommate. (45983 Tr., p.
317, Ls. 6-20; p. 318, Ls. 7-11; p. 318, L. 25 – p. 321, L. 8.) Wenke had a black drawstring bag with an Oregon Ducks logo on it. (45983 Tr., p. 320, Ls. 17-24.) The bag
appeared to be “about half full.” (45983 Tr., p. 321, Ls. 21-25.) Wenke, Hickman, and
Witte drove to Hickman’s home in Payette, Idaho. (45983 Tr., p. 321, Ls. 6-17.)
When they arrived at Hickman’s home, Hickman could smell marijuana. (45983
Tr., p. 323, Ls. 8-11.) She walked inside and caught her son “smoking a blunt.” (45983
Tr., p. 323, Ls. 13-18.) Hickman made her son get rid of the blunt, and then went to her
bedroom to change. (45983 Tr., p. 323, Ls. 19-23.)
About five minutes later, Hickman came out of the bedroom to an odor of marijuana
so strong that it immediately gave Hickman a headache. (45983 Tr., p. 324, Ls. 3-24.) It
was a much stronger odor than she previously smelled when she caught her son smoking a
blunt. (45983 Tr., p. 324, L. 25 – p. 325, L. 5.) Hickman went into the kitchen and saw
Wenke take a cookie sheet of marijuana out of the oven. (45983 Tr., p. 325, Ls. 6-15.)
When Hickman asked Wenke what he was doing, Wenke responded that “he was drying
[the marijuana] in the oven.” (45983 Tr., p. 325, Ls. 16-18.) Wenke took the marijuana
into the back bedroom. (45983 Tr., p. 326, Ls. 1-5.)
At about that same time, Officer Mattson with the Payette City Police Department
knocked on Hickman’s door. (45983 Tr., p. 179, L. 23 – p. 180, L. 3; p. 186, L. 22 – p.

1

A similar recitation of the facts can be found in the opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals.
State v. Wenke, No. 45983, 2019 WL 6713403, at *1-2 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2019).
2

188, L. 7; p. 326, Ls. 6-23.) He and some other officers had come to check for a reported
stolen motorcycle and to perform a welfare check after hearing reports “of children in the
residence being exposed to and offered illegal substances to consume.” (45983 Tr., p. 185,
Ls. 3-12.) He had smelled marijuana at the front gate of the property, and the odor’s
strength increased as he approached the house. (45983 Tr., p. 187, L. 5 – p. 188, L. 4.)
“[T]he smell was much stronger than that of a simple joint … it definitely smelled like a
hot, burning type of marijuana.” (45983 Tr., p. 194, Ls. 9-17.)
Hickman opened the door. (45983 Tr., p. 188, Ls. 8-9.) She allowed the officers
to run the VIN number on a motorcycle on her property, and the motorcycle did not come
back as stolen. (45983 Tr., p. 189, Ls. 6-22.) Officer Mattson asked who all was in the
residence. (45983 Tr., p. 189, Ls. 23-25.) Hickman told him that her five children and
Witte were inside but did not tell him that Wenke was inside. (45983 Tr., p. 190, Ls. 1-6.)
Officer Mattson asked everyone to come out of the house. (45983 Tr., p. 327, Ls. 7-9.) He
asked Witte whether anybody else was in the house as she was leaving, and “she eventually
divulged that Mr. Wenke … was in the back of the residence still.” (45983 Tr., p. 190, Ls.
7-17.) Upon Officer Mattson’s request, Witte retrieved Wenke. (45983 Tr., p. 190, L. 18
– p. 191, L. 7.) Officer Mattson saw Wenke come out of the back bedroom. (45983 Tr.,
p. 191, Ls. 2-7.)
Hickman gave Officer Mattson and his colleagues permission to search her
residence. (45983 Tr., p. 194, Ls. 18-20.) The officers found “a green, flaky substance
that looked to be marijuana on her table.” (45983 Tr., p. 194, L. 21 – p. 195, L. 4.) They
also found a few buds of marijuana in a zippered pouch in the living room. (45983 Tr., p.
195, Ls. 18-24.)
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After finding the marijuana in Hickman’s kitchen and living room, the officers
decided to secure a search warrant before continuing the search. (45983 Tr., p. 196, Ls. 514.) The officers “secured the premises” and “made sure there was no other occupants of
the house.” (45983 Tr., p. 196, Ls. 15-24.) Wenke, Hickman, and Witte were initially
detained outside. (45983 Tr., p. 196, L. 25 – p. 197, L. 3; p. 333, Ls. 1-6.) Hickman asked
Wenke what he had done with the marijuana. (45983 Tr., p. 333, Ls. 10-12.) Wenke
responded that he put it in the back bedroom in the closet in a bucket. (45983 Tr., p. 333,
Ls. 13-20.) Because of the cold weather, the officers moved the adults to the jail while
awaiting the search warrant. (45983 Tr., p. 333, Ls. 1-6; p. 334, L. 17 – p. 335, L. 1.)
A judge signed a search warrant for Hickman’s house and the vehicles parked at
the house. (45983 Tr., p. 198, Ls. 8-12.) In searching the house, the officers found in a
closet in the back bedroom a white plastic bucket that contained a large amount of
marijuana. (45983 Tr., p. 208, Ls. 12-24.) Officer Mattson subsequently weighed the
marijuana and determined it weighed 6.61 ounces. (45983 Tr., p. 226, Ls. 3-5.) In
searching Hickman’s car, the officers found a black draw-string Oregon Ducks bag with a
green leafy residue throughout the inside. (45983 Tr., p. 203, Ls. 1-19; p. 206, Ls. 18-23.)
The search of the house also produced a number of other items, including electronic scales.
(45983 Tr., p. 208, Ls. 12-24.)
On appeal Wenke asserted the following errors: “(1) the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted Officer Mattson’s video of Wenke; (2) the district court abused
its discretion by admitting impermissible propensity evidence under I.R.E. 404(b); (3) the
prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments amounting to
fundamental error; and (4) Wenke is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.”
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State v. Wenke, No. 45983, 2019 WL 6713403, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2019). The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Id. at *7.
In the notice of intent to dismiss, the district court first addressed the motion to
appoint counsel and denied it. (R., p. 48.) It then addressed whether the claims should be
dismissed. (R., pp. 49-55.)
The district court found no admissible evidence supported Wenke’s claims that
counsel refused to read police reports and refused to prepare for trial because he believed
the case would be dismissed under a Rule 29 motion. (R., pp. 51-53.) In addressing these
claims the district court stated “the record in the underlying case contradicts the assertions
made by Petitioner.” (R., p. 51, n. 4.) It further concluded Wenke’s factual claims were
assertions of Wenke’s “subjective dissatisfaction with his attorney’s performance,” and
were “conclusory at best.” (R., pp. 51-52.) The district court then concluded there was no
showing nor allegation of prejudice. (R., pp. 52-53.)
The district court next concluded Wenke’s claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue that one of the three felonies used to find he was a persistent violator
enhancement was in fact a misdemeanor could not have been prejudicial because, even if
true, there were still two prior felony convictions to support the jury verdict. (R., p. 53.)
Finally, the district court concluded that the claim trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to evidence that the farm where he obtained his marijuana was owned by
his family failed because there was no basis for such an objection and no reason to think
that the evidence, even if excludable, was prejudicial. (R., pp. 53-55.)
The district court entered judgment and Wenke timely appealed. (R., pp. 57-62.)
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ISSUE
Wenke states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Wenke’s motion for appointment of counsel?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Wenke failed to show that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were
not frivolous?

6

ARGUMENT
Wenke Has Failed To Show That His Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Were
Not Frivolous
A.

Introduction
Prior to dismissing Wenke’s petition, the district court denied his motion for

appointment of counsel. (R., p. 48.) Wenke contends the district court erred because he
“alleged facts which showed the possibility of a valid claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and the district court failed to apply the proper legal standard.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 5.) Specifically, Wenke contends the district court “evaluated Mr. Wenke’s right to
relief first, and then concluded, based on the lack of a right to relief, that Mr. Wenke was
not entitled to counsel,” and “did not consider whether circumstances prevented Mr.
Wenke from more thoroughly investigating the facts prior to filing his petition.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.) Wenke then argues he presented potentially viable claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel for not preparing for trial; not objecting to evidence that
the marijuana farm in question belonged to his family; and not objecting to “the arresting
officer’s statement that over a pound of marijuana was found on Mr. Wenke” and to “the
officer’s on-body video recording of his questioning of Mr. Wenke.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 8-9.)
Wenke’s arguments are not supported by the record. To the contrary, the record
shows that the district court first denied the motion for appointment of counsel before
dismissing the petition. Moreover, the record shows the district court applied the correct
legal standards. Finally, and most importantly, the record shows that Wenke’s petition
failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim and therefore he was not entitled to counsel
to pursue his frivolous claims.
7

B.

Standard Of Review
“A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Shackelford v. State, 160 Idaho 317, 325, 372 P.3d
372, 380 (2016); accord Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 393, 327 P.3d 365, 369 (2014)
(“The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the
discretion of the trial court.”).
C.

Wenke Did Not Allege Facts Showing The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
“The standard for determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner

in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility
of a valid claim.” Shackelford, 160 Idaho at 325, 372 P.3d at 380. “In determining whether
the appointment of counsel would be appropriate, every inference must run in the
petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected
to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.” Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 342,
223 P.3d 281, 284 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). To determine if a petitioner is entitled
to counsel, the Court “consider[s] whether the appointment of counsel would have assisted
him in conducting an investigation into facts not in the record and whether a reasonable
person with adequate means would have been willing to retain counsel to conduct that
further investigation into the claim.” Id. A petitioner “is not entitled to have counsel
appointed in order to search the record for possible nonfrivolous claims.” Murphy, 156
Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the “petitioner must
demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Chernobieff v. State, 168 Idaho 98, ___, 480 P.3d
8

136, 141 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). Counsel’s performance is deficient if it “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and the petitioner was prejudiced if he
demonstrates “a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial could be different but for
counsel’s deficient performance.” Marsalis v. State, 166 Idaho 334, ___, 458 P.3d 203,
209 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, to be entitled to counsel, Wenke had the
burden of demonstrating possibly valid claims both that his trial counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for that deficient performance
there was a reasonable chance he would have been acquitted.
The district court applied the correct legal standards when it denied Wenke’s
motion for appointment of counsel. (R., p. 48 (citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,
529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007), and State v. Charboneau, 140 Idaho 789, 794, 102 P.3d
1108, 1113 (2004)).) It incorporated its analysis of the merits of Wenke’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and concluded Wenke had “no right to relief.” (R., p. 48.)
In its merits analysis the district court identified the four claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel alleged by Wenke in his petition. In relation to the two claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to read police reports or otherwise prepare for trial, the
court concluded Wenke’s allegations were contradicted by the record in the underlying
criminal case. (R., p. 51, n. 4.) On the third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the
court reasoned that because three prior felonies supported the conviction for the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement, the claim counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
state’s use of one of them could not show prejudice. (R., p. 53.) Finally, the court reasoned
that counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to object to evidence that Wenke’s
family owned the Oregon farm where he obtained the marijuana underlying his conviction
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because no legal basis for such an objection existed and there was no evidence showing
prejudice. (R., pp. 53-55.) The district court’s analysis is supported by the record.
1.

Wenke was not entitled to counsel to pursue his claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel for lack of trial preparation. Wenke alleged his counsel “refused
to read police reports” and “refused to prepare for trial” because the case would be resolved
on a motion to dismiss. (R., p. 5.) The record of the underlying case, however, disproves
these allegations. Before trial, defense counsel represented to the court on multiple
occasions that he was prepared for trial. (45983 R., pp. 81, 139.) Moreover, the record
shows that no pre-trial motion to dismiss was ever filed. (See, generally, 45983 R.; R., p.
45 (stating what portions of the record the trial court took judicial notice of).) A motion
for acquittal was made at trial, after the state had presented its evidence, contending the
state’s case was based on the testimony of accomplices. (45983 Tr., p. 440, L. 9 – p. 442,
L. 15.) During the state’s presentation of evidence, defense counsel used the officers’
reports and affidavit extensively in cross-examination. (45983 Tr., p. 243, L. 1 – p. 255,
L. 3; p. 431, L. 16 – p. 432, L. 2; see also p. 493, L. 10 – p. 494, L. 6 (addressing cross
examination regarding reports in closing)). Because the record establishes that defense
counsel in fact utilized the police reports extensively at trial, there was no possibility of a
valid claim that counsel had not so much as read the police reports.
A petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief if his claims “are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings.” Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521,
236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). The district court’s finding that the record refutes Wenke’s
claims of lack of trial preparation by refusing to read reports and refusing to prepare
because of a motion is well-founded.

10

On appeal Wenke contends his mere allegations that counsel did not read police
reports and did nothing to prepare for trial is enough to secure appointment of counsel.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)

A petitioner is not entitled to appointment of counsel to

investigate whether allegations contrary to the underlying record are in fact true. Wenke
has failed to show error in denial of counsel to pursue his allegations that trial counsel
refused to read police reports or prepare for trial pending the outcome of a motion to
dismiss.
2.

Wenke was not entitled to counsel for his claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for not challenging one of his prior felony convictions. The district court
concluded that counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to challenge one of the
three prior felony convictions used to prove the persistent violator sentencing enhancement
because only two of the three were necessary to sustain the finding of the enhancement.
(R., p. 53.) The record supports this determination. The state alleged three felony
convictions in support of its charge of the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(45983 R., pp. 78-79.) It presented evidence of three prior felonies at trial. (45983 Tr., p.
513, L. 10 – p. 522, L. 5.) Even if one of the felony convictions was challengeable, there
was no conceivable prejudice.
Wenke does not specifically address this claim on appeal or assert that he was
entitled to counsel to pursue it. (See
- - Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.)
3.

Wenke was not entitled to counsel to pursue his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel for failing to object to evidence that he obtained the marijuana
from a marijuana farm owned by his brother. The evidence at trial was that Wenke
obtained the marijuana in question from his brother’s marijuana farm. (45983 Tr., p. 292,
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Ls. 4-15; p. 317, Ls. 6-20; p. 318, Ls. 4-11; p. 320, L. 5 – p. 321, L. 8; p. 357, L. 9 – p.
362, L. 5; p. 368, L. 22 – p. 373, L. 9.) Wenke alleged his trial counsel was ineffective
because he “refused to object” to this evidence. (R., p. 6.) The district court concluded
Wenke had provided no claim of why this evidence was objectionable, and therefore failed
to present a claim of deficient performance or prejudice. (R., pp. 54-55.) Because the
evidence that Wenke obtained the marijuana at his brother’s marijuana farm was
admissible evidence, Wenke failed to present the possibility of a valid claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for not objecting to this evidence.
On appeal Wenke argues “[a]ppointed counsel would have been able to identify,
based on the entire record and conversations with Mr. Wenke, the reason that trial counsel
should have objected to testimony regarding a family marijuana farm.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 8.) Tellingly absent from this argument is any articulation of what potentially viable
objection could have been made. (Id.) Wenke’s appellate counsel’s inability to articulate
a basis for an objection demonstrates why this was not a potentially valid claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
4.

Wenke’s appellate argument related to a claim unasserted in his

petition is meritless because post-conviction petitioners are not entitled to counsel to
search the record for claims. Having failed on appeal to show that his petition alleged
any potentially valid claim, Wenke next argues that there was another potential claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically, that trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to a portion of the video of the interview of Wenke in which the officer stated
that over a pound of marijuana was found. (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) However, this
argument is flatly precluded by applicable precedent. A petitioner “is not entitled to have

12

counsel appointed in order to search the record for possible nonfrivolous claims.” Murphy,
156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369. Wenke asserted no claim related to the lack of an
objection to the video of his questioning by police. (R., pp. 4-7.) He cannot assert that he
was entitled to appointment of counsel to pursue an unpled claim.
5.

Wenke’s argument that the district court applied an incorrect legal

standard is without merit. Wenke argues the district court “failed to apply the proper
legal standard.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) Specifically, Wenke contends the district court
“did not apply two different standards,” one for the merits dismissal and another for the
appointment of counsel, when it stated it was denying the motion for appointment of
counsel because “‘there is no right to relief.’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) This argument is
without merit.
First, the district court did apply the correct legal standard. It specifically stated
that the applicable standard was “‘whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility
of a valid claim that would require further investigation on the defendant’s behalf.’” (R.,
p. 48 (quoting Workman, 144 Idaho at 529, 164 P.3d at 809.) Wenke’s argument that the
district court abandoned or disregarded the very authority it relied on in its analysis is
without basis.
Finally, the claimed error was harmless. If the petitioner has “failed to raise the
possibility of a valid claim,” any error by the district court is harmless because the
petitioner’s “substantial rights were not violated by any alleged error” and therefore
“I.R.C.P. 61 requires the Court to disregard the error.” Shackelford, 160 Idaho at 326, 372
P.3d at 381. As set forth above, Wenke failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim.
Therefore any error by the district court was harmless.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the denial of Wenke’s motion
for appointment of counsel.
DATED this 20th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of May, 2021, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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